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ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED
MORGAN'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS ON SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BECAUSE EXPERT TESTIMONY WAS
UNNECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THAT H E R INJURIES
WERE CAUSED BY T H E ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF THE
HOSPITAL.
Defendants rely upon this Court's ruling in Fox v. Brigham Young
University, 2007 UT App, 406,176 P.3d 446., to argue that expert witness
testimony is necessary in the present case to prevent jurors from having to
"resort to speculation when making a decision on whether the alleged
negligence caused Morgan's injuries/' In Fox, the plaintiff sued the university
alleging negligence that caused her to fall down a flight of steps on campus,
resulting in a broken right leg. Significantly, the plaintiff made several
statements to the EMTs responding to the scene:
While the EMTs were assessing her condition and treating her, Mrs. Fox
repeatedly stated to them that she felt her right knee go out as she was
going down. She explained to the EMTs that she fell down only one
stair, that she had been previously diagnosed with osteoarthritis in her
right knee, and that there was some missing cartilage in that knee. Mrs.
Fox also stated that she did not hold BYU responsible, but that she had
always felt that the stairs by the Harman Building were too narrow and
have always been dangerous.

Id. at f 5.
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The plaintiffs did not provide a causation expert, arguing instead that
Mrs. Fox's injuries were "within the realm of common experience and because
there was no significant lapse of time between the injury and the onset of the
physical condition for which Ms. Fox sought compensation." Id. at f 9. The
trial court granted summary judgment. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial
court's ruling, holding that the trial court "did not err in dismissing the Foxes'
negligence claim for failure to present expert testimony on the element of
causation because the factors associated with Mrs. Fox's fall and injury were
sufficiently medically complex to require such testimony." Id. at f 25.
The present case is distinguished from FAX in several respects. First,
contrary to Defendants' characterization, Midge Morgan ("Midge") did not
have a "long history of shoulder problems." Midge testified that she dislocated
her right shoulder in 1970, requiring surgery to put a staple. The staple was
removed approximately three or four months later. (Rec. 261) She testified that
between 1970 and 1998, she had no further shoulder problems. (Rec. 261) In
June of 1998, Midge was in an automobile accident. As a result of that
accident, she suffered pain in the upper part of her shoulders, where they
connect to her neck. (Rec. 262). Midge's treating physician, Dr. Stephen J.
Warner ("Dr. Warner") testified that the symptoms Midge reported at this time
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were consistent with neck injuries sustained in the automobile accident and not
shoulder injuries. (Rec. 285; 289, ^f 8) Midge testified that she does not recall
any doctor telling her that she had any preexisting or degenerative shoulder
injuries. (Rec. 269) Immediately after the incident with Nurse Rebecca Davis
("Ms. Davis"), Midge did not provide alternate explanations for her injuries,
unlike Mrs. Fox. She testified that the pain she felt after Ms. Davis attempted
to yank her out of the bed was unlike anything she had ever felt before. (Rec.
276) In short, Midge's injuries bear litde resemblance to those in Fox.
Second, unlike Fox, Defendants in the present case were not passive
agents in Midge's injuries. No other human actors directly acted upon Mrs.
Fox; her leg gave out as she was descending the stairs. In the present case,
Midge's injuries did not occur because she was simply lying in her hospital bed.
Midge argues that her injuries were the direct result of the actions of Ms. Davis,
the agent of the Defendants. Midge alleges that had Ms. Davis not attempted
to yank Midge out of bed, her rotator cuffs would not have torn.
Plaintiff also rejects the argument that Defendants' unrebutted expert
testimony warrants summary judgment. In Bac^uk p. Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center, 2000 UT App. 225, 8 P.3d 1037, this Court rejected the argument that
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summary judgment is always warranted in cases where one party provides
unrebutted exculpatory evidence, holding:
When a plaintiff relies on res ipsa loquitur, "[if] any defendant can come
forward with a conclusive exculpatory statement or explanation of how the
injury occurred, then the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not apply
because there is no longer a need for an inference of negligence or
causation." If, however, defendant's explanation is not conclusive, "then
it is up to the finder of fact to decide whether plaintiff has established all
of the elements of negligence.. .by a preponderance of the evidence."
Id. at \ 17 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
In the present case, Defendants argue that the nature of Midge's injuries
require expert testimony in order to be understood by the jurors. To support
this argument, Defendants offer the testimony of Dr. Bruce Evans ("Dr.
Evans") to explain how Midge's injuries occurred. Dr. Evans testified that in
his opinion, the rotator cuff injuries Midge suffered were inconsistent with they
type of injury she alleges. (Rec. 425-426). The testimony of Dr. Evans is
offered as an exculpatory explanation of the cause of Midge's injuries.
Plaintiff counters Dr. Evans' testimony with that of Midge's treating
physicians, Dr. Warner and Dr. Michael Metcalf ("Dr. Metcalf). Dr. Warner
testified that he has cared for Midge since May 4,1999. (Rec. 282) He also
testified that the symptoms Midge complained of prior to the surgery on
February 26, 2003, were consistent with her neck injuries, not shoulder
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problems. (Rec. 239, ^f 8; 285) He also testified that if the incident happened as
Midge described, this single incident could have torn both of Midge's rotator
cuffs. (Rec. 288-289) In the present case, therefore, Defendants have not
offered a "conclusive exculpatory statement or explanation of how the injury
occurred," as this Court held in Bac^uk. As such, summary judgment was
inappropriate in this case. It falls to the finder of fact to examine all of the facts
of the case to determine whether Plaintiff has established all of the elements of
negligence by a preponderance of the evidence.
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH
THE STANDARD OF CARE AND BREACH OF THE
STANDARD OF CARE IN THIS CASE.
Defendants argue that expert witness testimony is required to
demonstrate the standard of care and breach of the standard of care in medical
malpractice cases. Defendants cite Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center,
791 P.2d 193 (Utah 1990), and Chadmck v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App.
1987) to support this contention. But a closer reading of these and other cases
indicates that the rule is not as clear-cut as Defendants would make it appear.
In Dalley, for example, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit, claiming
that she received a burn on her right calf while undergoing an elective caesarian
section operation. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary
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judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to produce expert medical
testimony to establish what instrumentality caused the burn. In overturning the
trial court's decision, the Utah Supreme Court held:
It would appear that it is within the knowledge and experience of
laypersons that a woman with a healthy leg does not usually go into an
operating room for a caesarean section operation and emerge with a
burn on her leg without some occurrence of negligence. This type of
inference does not require expert testimony concerning the standard of
care and breach of that standard.
Another requirement to establish the evidentiary foundation of res ipsa
loquitur is that the plaintiff prove that she did not contribute to the
injury suffered. Again, it would appear that it is within the general
experience and knowledge of laypersons that a woman who is under an
epidural anesthetic rendering her essentially paralyzed from the waist
down during the caesarian section delivery of a child generally is not in a
position to negligently or intentionally burn herself on the back of her
right calf. We conclude that laypersons are capable of discerning whether
the injury occurred irrespective of any participation by the plaintiff.
Jft,791P.2datl96.
A better reading of the rule regarding expert testimony in medical
malpractice cases comes from King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858
(Utah 1992). In King, the plaintiff brought suit against her physician and the
manufacturer of an intrauterine device (IUD), after the IUD perforated her
uterus. The trial court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer. In
reversing and remanding the trial court's ruling, the Utah Supreme Court held:
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Accordingly expert evidence is usually necessary to establish either direct
evidence of malpractice or a foundation for a legitimate res ipsa
inference, "because the nature of the [medical] profession removes the
particularities of its practice from the knowledge and understanding of
the average citizen.
Of course, in some medical malpractice cases, common knowledge and experience of
laypersons is sufficient to establish a foundation for a conclusion of negligence. A

classic example is leaving a foreign object in a patient's body during
surgery. Clearly, a lay person can reasonably and legitimately infer from
his or her common knowledge and experience that leaving a foreign
object in a person during a surgical operation is a negligent act.
Id, 832 P.2d 858, 862 863 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted, emphasis added).
In Bac^uk, the plaintiff received a pressure injury and burns to his
buttocks and right leg from a heating pad while he was undergoing surgery to
reattach fingers that had been severed in a snowblower accident. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, on the grounds that the plaintiff had
offered no expert opinion to rebut the defendants' expert opinions. The trial
court granted summary judgment, concluding that, in the absence of such
expert testimony, there was no issue of material fact regarding the defendants'
alleged negligence. In reversing and remanding the trial court's decision, this
Court held that "[i]t is within the understanding of laypersons that [the
plaintiffs] burn and/or pressure injury on an originally uninjured part of his
body not involved in the surgery more probably than not resulted from
negligence." Id. at f 7. This Court went on to state:
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It requires no medical or technical expertise to understand that a person
may suffer a burn and/or a pressure injury from lying in the same
position for too long on a heating pad. Nor does it require medical
expertise to understand the steps that must be taken to avoid such
injuries. Accordingly, Plaintiff was justified in relying on the
understanding of laypersons to survive Defendants' summary judgment
motion.
Defendants argue that their experts' affidavits show that the cause of
Plaintiffs injury is beyond the understanding of laypersons. Where, as
here, a plaintiff relies on the knowledge and understanding of laypersons
to establish the evidentiary foundation from which negligence may be
inferred, "a defendant may challenge the adequacy of that foundation
with evidence showing that [the inference of negligence] is actually
beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience." However,
summary judgment for defendants will be denied if "the res ipsa loquitur
inference [is] strong enough to survive a motion for a directed verdict at
the close of the plaintiffs case."
Id. atffij 1142 (internal citations omitted).
In Collins v. Utah State Developmental Center, 1999 UT App. 336, 992 P.2d
492, the plaintiff brought suit as guardian for a mentally retarded adult residing
in an intermediate care facility. The individual was injured while playing on a
swing while under the supervision of two staff members of the facility. The trial
court granted the facility's motion for a direct verdict on the grounds that
without expert testimony, the plaintiff did not establish the applicable standard
of care and the breach thereof. In reversing and remanding the trial court's
ruling, this Court held that expert testimony was unnecessary:
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The record does not show, and the Center does not suggest, that the
implementation of the decision to allow Collins to swing had "to be
performed by a person with medical training or that it involved the
exercise of medical judgment or required medical expertise." Most jurors
could easily ascertain the standard of care owed to a three-year-old when
supervising her on a swing. Similarly, they would understand the
standard of care owed to a person with Collins5 capacities. Simply put,
the duty the Center owed to Collins, and its alleged breach, required no
expert testimony.
Collins therefore did not need expert testimony to establish the
appropriate standard of care and any breach thereof. "In this type of
situation, the plaintiff can rely on the common knowledge and
understanding of laymen to establish this element"
U, 1999 UT App 336,ffij10-11, 992 P.2d 492 (internal citations omitted).
Also illuminating in the present case is the Georgia Court of Appeals
decision in Moore v. Louis Smith Memorial Hospital, Inc., 454 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. App.
1995), discussed at length by the Utah Court of Appeals in Collins, 1999 UT
App. 336, ffl| 9-10, 992 P.2d 492. In Moore, a nursing home patient was injured
when being moved from her wheelchair to her bed when her foot became
caught in a bed rail. The court held that expert testimony was not necessary in
this case, as the circumstances did not require the exercise of expert medical
judgment:
In this case, plaintiff was injured while being moved from her wheelchair
to her bed. The record does not show and defendant does not suggest
that this aspect of plaintiff s care was required to be performed by a
person with medical training or that it involved the exercise of medical
judgment or required medical expertise. "[U]nder all of the evidence of
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record, the safe movement of [plaintiff] from the [wheelchair to the bed]
was merely an act of relative physical strength and dexterity rather than
an act requiring the exercise of expert medical judgment."
Id., 454 S.E.2d 192 (citation omitted, alterations in original). The facts in Moore
are quite similar to the present case. Both involve moving patients, rather than
complex medical procedures or specialized medical knowledge. Removing
Midge safely from the bed, as in Moore, was simply a matter of the relative
strength and dexterity of Ms. Davis. It did not require the exercise of expert
medical judgment. This appears to be the type of exception to the expert
witness requirement envisioned by the weight of Utah case law.
Likewise, in the present case, it would appear to "be within the
knowledge and experience of laypersons" that a woman does not usually go
into the hospital for neck surgery and emerge with not one, but two torn
rotator cuffs without some kind of negligence. Plaintiff is justified in relying on
the understanding of laypersons to understand the circumstances surrounding
her injuries. Midge testified that prior to the surgery on February 26, 2003, the
pain she was suffering did not come from the location of the rotator cuffs.
(Rec. 262). Dr. Warner testified that he did not attribute the pain Midge
experienced as related to her shoulders. (Rec. 288) Immediately after the
incident with Ms. Davis, Midge testified that she felt excruciating pain where
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the shoulders and upper arms meet, and that it was unlike anything she had
experienced before. (Rec. 276).
The present case is also distinguishable from both Hoopiiaina and
Chadwick. In Hoopiiaina, for example, the plaintiff contended that he was
mistakenly administered quinadine intended for another patient in the same
hospital room. The plaintiff suffered injuries to his lungs and cardiovascular
system, which he attributed to the drug. In this case, expert testimony was
mandatory, as the effects of quinadine are clearly beyond the understanding of
the average person.
The issue in Chadwick was whether the defendant committed malpractice
in the course of removing a varicose vein from the plaintiffs leg, a process
known as a saphenous phlebectomy. Prior to this operation, plaintiff insisted
on having a phleborheogram test done to determine if her veins and circulatory
system were functioning properly. The plaintiff in this case conducted no
discovery whatsoever. Expert testimony was required in this case in order to
determine whether the defendant properly analyzed the results of the test prior
to conducting the surgery, as this knowledge was also clearly beyond the
understanding of the average person. This Court affirmed summary judgment
for the defendant physician, on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to provide
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qualified expert testimony necessary to understand the required standard of
care. But in so doing, this Court reaffirmed the common knowledge exception
to the expert witness rule, stating:
Due to the technical and complex nature of a medical doctor's services,
expert medical testimony must be presented at trial in order to establish
the standard of care and proximate cause - except in unusual
circumstances. For example, "expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the
standard oj care owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is
within the common knowledge and experience of the layman!'

Id., 763 P.2d at 821. (citations omitted) (emphasis added)
The present case is significantly different. It does not require specialized
knowledge of drugs, or of vascular surgery, to analyze the propriety of Ms.
Davis' actions on the day in question. As the court held in Moore, this is an issue
of relative strength and dexterity rather than an act requiring the exercise of
expert medical judgment. No specialized knowledge is required, making expert
testimony unnecessary. In addition, unlike Chadwick, extensive discovery has
been conducted in this case. Several depositions have been taken, both parties
have been served and answered, and both parties have provided documents.
Midge's treating physicians are prepared to testify regarding the injuries to
Midge's shoulders. The primary question at issue in this case concerns the
manner in which Ms. Davis attempted to move Midge out of the hospital bed.
Midge claims that Ms. Davis yanked her out of bed by the arms. Ms. Davis
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claims that she put her arm around Midge's back to support her. This is a clear
issue of fact, which makes summary judgment unwarranted in this case.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is inappropriate in this case. Expert testimony is not
necessary in this case, either to establish that her injuries were caused by the
alleged negligence of the hospital or to establish the requisite standard of care
and breach of the standard of care. Moving a patient from a hospital bed does
not require the type of expert knowledge required in Hoopiiaina or Chadwick As
the court held in Collins and Moore, in this kind of case, the plaintiff can rely on
the common knowledge and understanding of laymen. A layperson can assess
whether or not it is negligent to yank or jerk a patient out of a hospital bed with
such force that it causes injury.
In addition, the evidence provided by Dr. Metcalf, Dr. Warner and
Midge creates a question of fact for the jury to determine whether Midge's torn
rotator cuffs could have been caused by Ms. Davis yanking or jerking her out
of bed.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Midge Morgan respectfully requests
the Court to reverse the decision of the trial court.

DATED this 7?~ day of September 2010.
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.

TIM DALTON DUNN
SUSAN BLACK DUNN
CHRYSTAL MANCUSO-SMITH
Attorneysfor PlaintiffMidge Morgan
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